strategy for lessening the impact of the brain drain and perhaps even as a strategy for turning a potential loss into a significant gain.
5

Re-conceptualizing the Brain Drain
Among scholars who study the brain drain and the migration of scientific personnel, the diaspora option has become an important strategy for utilizing the outflow that occurred due to the original brain drain. This idea involves a major re-conceptualization of the brain drain, seeing it less as a permanent exodus but more as a pattern of "brain circulation," where talent may go abroad, but much information is circulated back to the original home country. 6 In this way, scientific collaboration may ensue without people in the diaspora uprooting their lives and moving back home.
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Since many of these countries, particularly poorer ones in Africa or Latin America, lack the financial wherewithal or market opportunities to trigger a significant return flow, the diaspora option is seen as critical to narrowing the North-south scientific gap. 8 For Dickson, the difficulty in triggering a reverse brain drain in many parts of the Third World, makes the diaspora option a moral necessity.
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The Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese were the first to follow this strategy within greater China. Many of these trans-nationalists, sometimes known as "astronauts" (taikong ren), 11 China, too, has begun to benefit from this diaspora option as more and more scientists and professors with established positions overseas, including those who are now employed in businesses or who are running their own companies, are coming back to engage in business development in China. Promoting this diaspora option also forms a key policy innovation introduced by the PRC government in its S&T and human resource policies in the last decade. It began in the mid-1990s, with the "spring light project" (chunhui jihua), which brought overseas mainlanders back for short-term visits, while the government went on to formulate a major policy breakthrough in 2001 with a strategy it calls "wei guo fuwu"
("serve the nation").
This paper looks at the evolution of this policy, presents some case studies, and uses data from a survey of mainland professionals in Silicon Valley to outline the characteristics of this process, whereby a mainland diaspora is bringing business opportunities, information and technology from the outside world to China.
Chinese Government Policy Towards Chinese who Study Abroad
The Chinese government's attitude towards mainlanders who studied abroad but did not California, 2002) . 12 There is a serious definitional problem here. Chinese sources call these people "liu xue renyuan," which includes both people who are currently studying abroad or who have graduated and are now working abroad. Moreover, they apply the term to scientists, academics, current the scale of the brain drain, officials in the Education Commission advocated severely constraining the outflow. 13 The State Science and Technology Commission, however, believed that if people stayed abroad they would more easily gain access to U.S. technological skills. And while the Ministry of Personnel also worried that if a massive inflow of talented people occurred, it would create a crisis in the labour market, then Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang reportedly portrayed the brain drain in a positive light, calling it "storing brain power overseas."
Following the Tiananmen crackdown, the flow of returnees stalled, as government policy swung sharply to the left, seeing many overseas students and scholars who marched in protest in the West as class enemies. But after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour, when he called on overseas students to return, promising that all would be forgotten if they did not engage in any more antigovernment activity when they returned, policy liberalized considerably. 14 In 1992, the official 12-point slogan on returnee policy emphasized the importance of getting people to come back and offered them the "freedom to come and go" (lai qu ziyou) after they had returned. 15 This policy was the first hint that the state would consider a free flow of mainlanders back and forth.
In fact, as early as 1992 the Chinese government began to encourage citizens who remained overseas to come back for short to medium periods of time, both to benefit from their knowledge and perhaps to show them the changes that had occurred in China over the previous ten years. According to one report, between 1992 and 1995, the Ministry of Education helped students and business people. But in English, the term frequently used is "overseas students," even though the majority of these people have long since graduated. In fact, of 160,000 mainlanders described in English as "overseas students" in the U. According to one study of Eastern Europe, the Chinese government actively employs traditional organizational principles, such as those underlying the United Front policy, to encourage overseas students and scholars to contribute to the motherland. Officials reportedly encourage people to join pro-mainland organizations, regularly meet with these associations, inform them about changes in the mainland, and encourage them to contribute to the motherland.
To reinforce this policy, they even call people who stay overseas "patriotic."
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Some mainland officials working overseas in the education sections of Chinese consulates deny that such a strategy exists, arguing that they mobilize people overseas much more haphazardly. Nowadays, they argue, the sole incentive that can successfully encourage cooperation is economic and self-interest, not ideology or patriotism. to strengthen alumni associations in the U.S. for all of its universities in order to disseminate information about business and scientific opportunities in Shanghai to mainlanders in the U.S.
The Emergence of a Highly Skilled Mainland Diaspora
Even before 1989, the number of highly trained mainlanders staying overseas began to According to the National Science Foundation data (Table 1) , between 1988 and 1996 China produced twice as many science and engineering Ph.D.s in the U.S., as its closest rival, Taiwan, and comprised 47% of all foreign science and engineering students who had firm plans to stay on in America, although many were on post-doctoral fellowships, which meant that they were more likely to return than if they had a secure job. However, as 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Different Ways to Serve the Country
We now look at ways that mainlanders in the diaspora serve China. Some strategies were employed by academics or scientists; others by people in business. Some combine the two cohorts; in particular, scientists working in universities or laboratories who devise a new product may be keen to manufacture it on the mainland, either for export or for sale in the domestic market.
Serving Through Teaching or Lecturing
People overseas can help the mainland by teaching, lecturing, or organizing seminars. Moreover, their publications count as publications of the university that has appointed them as a special research associates (teping yanjiu yuan).
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Still, managing such joint positions is not so easy. One interviewee said that, when he is in Canada, he spends half a day on email with China. Second, his wife and child do not want to return to China permanently-his son got sick during their first return visit. Finally, numerous landmines await part-time returnees. A local scholar in his lab (tu bie pai) resents his influence and schemes against him, forcing him to spend too much time dealing with "personal politics."
Establishing Businesses in China
China's government encourages mainlanders overseas to establish businesses in China (chuan ye) and includes this activity under the rubric of "serving the country." No doubt, the primary motivation of these people is profit; therefore, some observers assert that this form of activity should not be seen as "service." For example, Jon Unger asks: "How are these Chinese any different from a Korean businessman or an American investor who invests in China?"
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They differ in several ways. First, they are a new phenomenon-only in the past few years has the generation of overseas students who went out after 1978 amassed the financial wherewithal to invest in China. So, the government wants to encourage them. Second, the government recognizes this group's familiarity with high tech industries-a key target of the program to "strengthen the country through science and education" (ke jiao xing guo). Perhaps we should think of their incentives as running from patriotism to self-interest.
While foreigners fall close to the self-interest end of the spectrum, overseas mainlanders are more likely to be influenced partly by a desire to "serve the country." While foreigners are looking primarily for cheap labour or access to China's domestic market, China's rise makes many mainlanders overseas proud and they want to be part of that process.
Overseas mainlanders have organized economic associations or special companies to invest in China. In San Francisco, mainlanders who have been overseas for over 10 years created a "huiguo chuangye zhuanjia tuan" ("Specialists who return to establish companies in China").
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All either own their own companies or work in American companies, but together have established companies or joint ventures in China using capital and/or new technology.
These business associations often establish contact with one locality, perhaps even a small city, where strong ties with local officials yields important local preferential policies. These localities recognize that without preferential policies, they cannot get access to the technology Chinese-Canadian Invention and Technology Association, established by a mainland professor at a university in southern Ontario, has over a hundred members. 48 The group set up six companies in Mianyang, the second largest city in Sichuan province. "When we visit, the mayor comes to meet us, so we get lots of support. The president of the association, a very entrepreneurial type, spends half his time there each year." They also got a Taiwanese investor to put in US$500,000, and have set up a special district for returnees in the city.
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The founder of this organization is a classic example of a scholar turned entrepreneur.
His academic field is powder technology, which can be used for painting automobiles-replacing spray paint, which is smelly if not toxic-or for inhaling medicine directly into the blood stream.
He has set up two companies in China to manufacture this powder. Researchers in Sichuan Province were among three groups in China that approached him to apply for funds available only to people overseas. In fact, they wrote the proposals themselves, but needed his participation. While this helps domestic scholars to get access to money, "this is actually a way for me to get money." In fact, in 1999, he was awarded 400,000 RMB by the Natural Science Foundation as an "exemplary young scholars" (jiechu qingnian), and since he could not take the money out of China he found local partners with whom to cooperate. This gave him the chance to establish a program in China, which helped him get ideas from China. The vast majority (79%) had come to attend school in the U.S. and stayed on, while another 9% had been recruited directly by American companies to come to the U.S. Not surprisingly, 89% had scientific, technical or engineering degrees, and 82% had earned their highest degree in the U.S. Two-thirds were technical professionals in non-managerial positions.
In the following analysis, we extracted two key groups whom we compare to the overall cohort. First, are those in Silicon Valley who own their own companies or who, at some point, owned a company. We assume that company owners are more entrepreneurial and more likely to engage the mainland. Second, we look at individuals who actively "serve China," and compare them to people who are not actively "serving China" in order to better understand the "servers."
A key issue for China is to increase the flow of technology back to China. To what extent do mainlanders in Silicon Valley exchange technology "regularly" (versus "sometimes" or "never") with classmates, friends or business associates back in China? Among the entire group, 19% do so on a "regular" basis. However, 28% of one-time company owners do so as compared to 16% of non-company owners (figure 2). Owning a company significantly increased the likelihood that technology flows occur. 55 We are deeply grateful to Dr. Saxenian, whose work was funded by the Public Policy Institute of California, for sharing her data set with us. Much of her analysis combined mainlanders and Taiwanese into a Greater China category, which she juxtaposed to Indians in Silicon Valley. We used only her responses from mainlanders for our analysis. Her total data set is composed of 2,273 responses by Chinese, Indians and Taiwanese. While approximately 530 mainlanders filled out the web-based questionnaire, 144 respondents did not complete all aspects of the survey, as certain questions about their links to China failed to appear on the screen while they were filling Among people considering setting up a company in China, 23% regularly exchange technology with colleagues on the mainland, many more than those not considering setting up a company on the mainland (9%). So, technology exchanges are an important step for those in the diaspora who want to establish a new company in China.
Among the 386 respondents, 33% have helped others arrange business contacts in China, with 61% of company owners and 22% of non-owners having done so. Company owners are also a key source of information for firms in China; 32% of them having consulted for Chinese companies. Only 15% of the entire population, and only 8% of non-owners, have played this role.
Are these people an important source of capital for China? Not yet. According to the survey, among the 117 company owners, 17 (15%) have invested once in a start-up in China, while another 16 (14%) have invested more than once. Of 267 non-owners, only eight (3%) have invested in a start-up and, of those, only two invested more than once.
in the survey. Therefore, 386 mainlanders, who responded to the entire survey, comprise our data set.
The "Servers"
To understand the characteristics of those who are "serving" China, we selected all the people who responded positively to four questions: these categories were drawn from the list of activities proposed by the Chinese government in its 2001 policy document cited above on "wei guo fuwu." 56 We then broke this group into four, based upon the number of these activities that they carried out. So, while we can compare "servers" and "non-servers," we can also see if there are differences within the group that is serving the country. Finally, we ran a multiple regression
model to see what are the most important independent variables that explain who does and who does not serve the country.
Of 386 people who answered the entire questionnaire, 179 (46%) responded positively to one of our four questions, with 100 employing one mode, 48 involved in two, 19 involved in three, and 12 involved in all four modes. This shows significant links among mainlanders in Silicon Valley and China.
What are some of their key characteristics? Age is statistically significant, as "servers" tend to be older than non-servers; in the 36-50 year-old cohort, servers outnumber non-servers by 39% versus 29%. Gender is significant, as 72% of servers are male, while only 28% are women.
Among non-servers, the ratio is 59% men and 41% women. And, the percentage of women declines progressively among those who are more active. Citizenship appears to be important; those with U.S. citizenship are involved more than those holding non-U.S. passports (40% vs. 31%). Also, 40% of servers are U.S. citizens, as compared to 29% of non-servers. On the other hand, 40% of non-servers hold U.S. permanent residency (green cards) while only 30% of "servers" have this status. Those holding MBAs and Ph.D.s are more likely to engage with China and tend to be more active than other degree holders. Looking at current jobs, those with managerial or executive positions in corporations are more likely to serve China than those with technical or other professional experience. Thus among 92 business executives and managers, 72% were serving China while only 28% were not.
The size of the firm is inversely proportional to level of engagement, as those working in small firms may need the contacts, while large firms have less need to work with China.
Particularly individuals employing 10-49 people in their firm are much more likely to be serving the country than not (21.0% vs. 7.5%), perhaps because they want access to cheaper labour, while the firms least likely to "serve" are those with over 1,000 employees (54% of all non-servers versus 37% of servers).
As the Chinese government would predict, participation in professional associations makes one more likely to serve China, either because the organization encourages involvement, but more likely, because those who want to be involved with China attend such meetings. Among the most active servers (employing 2 or more modes), 41 percent attend professional meetings once or more per month, while 60 percent attend meetings at least four times a year.
Founding or running a company increases the likelihood of being a server, with full and part-time owners comprising 17% of non-servers but 47% of servers. Among servers, part-time owners are a little more active (26%) than full-time owners (21%). People planning to set up a business are more likely to serve; 60% of people planning to open a company are engaged with China versus 46% of non-servers. Also, those considering returning to live in China are more active on the mainland, perhaps building relationships that will help them after they return.
Among those who say that they are "quite likely to return to the mainland," 21.3% say that they are serving China, while non-servers comprise only 8.5% of this group. Moreover, among the 12 people who are most active, 10 of them are "quite likely to return," which means that in future they may no longer serve from overseas. Finally, knowing people who have returned makes one more likely to serve China-perhaps these returnees form the channels through which the servers serve.
However, while the above section describes bivariate relationships, we wanted to see the impact of all the independent variables, so we did a logistic regression, the results of which are shown in serving. This finding may reflect the fact that length of time, rather than immigration status, is correlated with serving. That is, people who had not been in the U.S. long enough to get citizenship and therefore only had a "green card" were less likely to serve China. Finally, in this last model, age drops out as a significant factor. "definitely returning to China" when they left, and another 33 percent said that "they were likely to return but wanted to work for a while before going back." This suggests a strong tie to the mainland.
Almost one-third of the academics said that they would give up their teaching position in Hong Kong and move to the mainland if they could get a job at a top university there (30/89 respondents), but 63/92 people who answered the question (68%) would like a joint position, teaching and/or working in both Hong Kong and the mainland. This interest in working on the mainland should be a strong motivating force to "help the motherland." High salaries-often needed to fund their children's college overseas-is the first reason that they want to stay in Hong Kong (23.5%), as is job opportunity (28%); but good research opportunities (12%) are important as well. In terms of their professional networks, their ties are still stronger with the West-only 23% said that their ties to the mainland were "stronger" or "much stronger" than their ties with the West (38%), but 35 percent said that their ties to both regions were about the same. Yet, 54 percent of respondents reported that since moving to Hong Kong their level of interaction with the mainland had "increased a lot" and 35 percent said it had "increased." Only seven percent said that it had not changed at all.
We asked people about the type of contacts they had on the mainland, which reflects their involvement in "serving the nation." They could select as many choices as was approporiate. Table 4 shows the percentage of responses for each of the different forms of interaction. Thus "running seminars" and "collaborative research projects with mainland scholars" were the most commonly selected forms of interaction. Running seminars is quite lucrative for teachers, especially if run through business programs. Many people were also training mainland students. Finally, we asked people the three most important reasons why they helped China. Was it out of self-interest or did they feel an important need to affect China in some important way? We did not ask this question in our original face-to-face interviews, nor in our initial email mailing of the survey, but on the suggestion of a mainland colleague, we included this question in subsequent requests for responses. The data, nonetheless, as displayed in Table 7 , are revealing. Above all, mainlanders in Hong Kong want to promote the quality of research on the mainland, a view articulated by a mainland scientist, who felt that improving research on the mainland was a key function mainlanders in Hong Kong could perform and one which motivated many of them.
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Clearly, he was correct. Getting good graduate students is also a strong motivation for working with the mainland, as is establishing good networks, which help with research and attracting students. Finally, mainlanders want to make China stronger.
The "Diaspora Approach:" An Option for China?
In the eyes of the world scientific community and people who study the brain drain, the "diaspora option" has important advantages. It is relatively inexpensive, allows expatriates to contribute to their home society without giving up their overseas situations, and yet, mitigates feelings of guilt. 59 But if the domestic scientific community is not large, it cannot support links with overseas researchers. "Sustained political support and an administrative capacity to manage the network are essential. And even with this support, ensuring the long-term survival of a diaspora network is a serious challenge since its population is very mobile, and may not always focus on national science and technology interests." 60 Government agencies and expatriates must be highly motivated, and updating of lists of expatriates abroad are necessary.
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Can the "diaspora model" succeed in China? Relative to African and Latin American countries, China's large indigenous and relatively developed scientific community allows for very fruitful interactions for people abroad. Mainlanders working overseas have much to learn from collaborators in China, and even though they themselves may be doing cutting edge research, Chinese colleagues can help move the research into new arenas. One professor in the diaspora commented that colleagues in China helped propel his research; moreover, he got access to high quality graduate students and research assistants in the mainland who were more stable and less expensive than graduate students in Canada, including mainland graduate students who he brings to Canada. Second, China's booming economy in China means that those who bring back a new technology can make a lot of money; but the result for China is the transfer of some expertise of new technology. Third, globalization of scientific techniques and the positioning of many Chinese in leading research centers in the West means that they have a lot to share with China.
Finally, China is not so poor; it can pay salaries and research costs incurred by scientists or academics, who return for shorter periods of time.
57 Gaillard & Gaillard, "Can the scientific diaspora save African science?" 60 ibid.
